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Revisiting the Philosophical Investigations’ Children1 
Abstract: In my 2003 article “The Philosophical Investigations’ children” I offered a non-
essentialist reading of the child in Wittgenstein’s work, arguing that such a reading 
challenged previous interpretations of the text by analysing an a priori reliance on a “real 
child” as part of a reliance on a “real world” somehow outside of textuality. I further argued 
that my anti-essentialist reading of the child is authorised by the Philosophical Investigations’ 
own arguments and positions and that interpretations of this text that maintain an investment 
in a materialist “real” (including the child as real or actual) fail fully to understand the nature 
of Wittgenstein’s interest in and definition of “language games” and an attendant engagement 
with issues of perspectives and their implications. In this article, I follow up on the current 
status of readings of the child in relation to Philosophical Investigations and the wider 
implications of those readings, including for ideas of the “pedagogy” of Philosophical 
Investigations itself, including demonstrating how both subsequent essentialist and non-
essentialist readings of Philosophical Investigations continue to overlook implications of 
non-essentialist thinking about childhood. 
 
Keywords: Wittgenstein; child; philosophy; pedagogy; children’s literature 
 
Children and childhood remain in philosophy, as in many other areas of humanities and 
literary research, mostly a marginal or specialist interest. An overwhelming proportion of 
publications in philosophy on the child and childhood engage with Romantic ideas of the 
child as natural philosopher: a Rousseau-inspired figure who views the world with wonder 
                                                          
1 I wish to express my warm thanks for the invaluable suggestions of an anonymous peer-
reviewer for revisions to the initial version of this article. 
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and innate curiosity.2 In a previous article, “The Philosophical Investigations’ children” 
(Lesnik-Oberstein 2003), I offered a non-essentialist reading of the child in the Philosophical 
Investigations, arguing that such a reading challenged extant interpretations by analysing an a 
priori reliance on a “real child” as part of a wider reliance on a “real world” somehow outside 
of textuality. I further argued that my anti-essentialist reading is authorised by the 
Philosophical Investigations’ own arguments and positions and that interpretations of this 
text that maintain an investment in a materialist “real” (including the child as real or actual) 
fail fully to understand the nature of Wittgenstein’s interest in and definition of “language 
games” and an attendant engagement with issues of perspectives and their implications. My 
arguments in this sense are related to anti-essentialist views such as those, for instance, of 
Henry Staten (1984) and David Stern (2004)3 although thinking specifically about reading the 
child in Philosophical Investigations produces different interpretations and implications than 
Staten’s and Stern’s in several respects. What is crucial to the link with especially Staten’s 
work, however, is that I will be following throughout this article his kind of interpretation of 
the profound consequences for how to read of anti-essentialist arguments: 
The first [maneuver] is by not giving a summary of his results but rather, by trying to 
show how we work through philosophical texts to get these results. […] I understand 
“ordinary language” not as something that is just there for us to see [… and] that we 
need Wittgenstein’s treatment to get us unstuck from too literal or uncritical or fixed 
                                                          
2 Amongst a wide range of educational writings on philosophy and children, perhaps best 
known in this area is the work of Gareth Matthews (for instance 1996). 
3 There are, however, of course also important differences between Staten and Stern’s 
arguments with Staten engaging with Deconstructive arguments while Stern is working with 
reading without appealing to an external context. 
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attachment to the formulas of traditional philosophy. […] “Linguistic philosophy” may 
recognize the dependence of meaning on language, but this recognition hardly ever 
extends so far as to include the signifying potential of the “accidental” sensual 
properties of signs. I will argue that Wittgenstein himself did treat language this way. 
(Staten 1984: xiii, xiv, xv)4 
In this article, I argue both that such an attitude to language is required in order to read the 
child (rather than take it for granted as something “just there for us to see”) and that 
Philosophical Investigations’ children read in such a way are part and parcel of core issues 
and questions of the text, not marginal or “accidental” figures. It is also my alignment with 
Staten’s arguments which differentiates my readings from those of Derek McDougall, whose 
discussion of the child in the opening of the Philosophical Investigations (McDougall 2017) 
does acknowledge its relevance to wider issues in the text. McDougall usefully reviews 
several previous approaches to the child5 in order to discover “how the description of 
Augustine’s child who is said to have already acquired his first language, bears upon the way 
                                                          
4 Staten’s comment on Newton Garver explains why my way of reading Wittgenstein’s work 
in this respect is allied with his but not Garver’s views:  
yet the orthodox mainstream (whether Wittgensteinian or not) continues the old 
Platonic quarrel with poetry. Not that contemporary philosophers would be so crass as 
to put down poems; it’s a matter of their attitude toward language. Thus Newton 
Garver, in his otherwise fine preface to Derrida’s work published in English, warned 
readers that they would experience “frequent discomfort” from Derrida’s style, and 
remarked that, fortunately, “students of Wittgenstein are already familiar with the 
problem of having to read through someone’s language in order to see the point lying 
behind it” (S[peech]&P[henomena]: xxvi). (Staten 1984: xv) 
5 Although McDougall does not reference my 2003 article. 
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in which philosophers have used the concept of a born-Crusoe to point towards an 
‘Individualist’ as distinct from a ‘Communitarian’ interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thinking 
(McDougall 2017: 61), but his discussion remains within the parameters of that particular 
discussion, including within a specific range of ideas about childhood.6 
In her 1999 book on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Beth Savickey 
pointed out that few critics pay explicit attention to Wittgenstein’s references to the child and 
childhood, particularly in his later work (Savickey 1999: 76). Savickey herself wrote a brief 
section on the child to argue that Wittgenstein’s “references to how children actually learn 
and use language [... are] observations and comments [...] drawn from his experiences as an 
elementary school teacher”, but that these references “are not offered as empirical evidence to 
support (or forward) theoretical or explanatory claims” (Savickey 1999: 69–70). Instead, she 
argued (paraphrasing Wittgenstein) that “the figure of the child is the figure that draws 
together the concepts of teaching and meaning, or learning and language” (Savickey 1999: 
70–71). Leaving aside here the difficulty of what it might mean for Savickey to make claims 
about Wittgenstein’s observing “how children actually learn and use language” while at the 
same time asserting that the child in his work is “a figure”, who “could [...] be imagined 
otherwise” (Savickey 1999: 70–71) (how the child can be both “actual” and “a figure” at the 
same time), Savickey did raise the question of the child in Philosophical Investigations 
without actually taking further the issue of the “figurality” she points towards. 
                                                          
6 Compare McDougall’s discussions about what the child might be in Philosophical 
Investigations with my argument that “In both the Augustine and throughout the 
Philosophical Investigations, though, despite the latter’s critiques of the former, 
the ‘child’ is the possibility—however temporary—of ‘different’ ‘consciousnesses’, 
‘understandings’, and/or ‘languages’” (Lesnik-Oberstein 2003: 382). 
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Savickey referred further only to Stanley Cavell as having discussed previously the 
child in the Philosophical Investigations. Cavell too describes the child in Romantic terms as 
a stable, “psychological” identity:  
The child’s language has a future. But when I try to imagine adults  
having just these words [...] I find that I imagine them moving sluggishly,  
as if dull-witted, or uncomprehending, like cave men. [...] in contrast [there  
is] the way a child “says” its four words—with what charming curiosity,  
expectation, excitement, repetitions [...] So that the training of children is  
a process of stupifying them into a state in which we encounter the  
grown-up builders [...] If the charges are recalcitrant [...] the consequences  
may be merely that the elders will not speak to them [...] and tell them they  
are bad. As our kind mostly does. (Cavell 1996: 278, 294)  
Cavell writes as if the “child” is not a “language game”—or language games—but instead is 
“outside” of, or prior to, language (and capable of “recalcitrance” in the face of it), a being of 
the “natural sciences”. Savickey did not note that Yasushi Maruyama (1998) and Richard 
Eldridge (1997) at that time had also offered analyses of several of the functions and 
meanings of the child in Philosophical Investigations, but I argued in my article (Lesnik-
Oberstein 2003) in any case in relation to their work that they both also essentialise the 
child—and hence their reading of the whole Philosophical Investigations: both ultimately 
stabilise the meaning of the child within a universalist, humanist framework as the “Other”, 
who, in the case of Maruyama, must be protected from oppression or mistreatment, or who, 
in the case of Eldridge, serves as an example of “a general anxiety that is present in human 
relationships [...] Natural anxieties of attunement and the difficult tasks of the 
acknowledgment of (some) differences as embodying rationality and freedom” (Eldridge 
1997: 202–203). Such essentialist assumptions about the child persist throughout the most 
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extensive recent publication in this area, Michael Peters and Jeff Stickney’s A Companion to 
Wittgenstein and Education. Pedagogical Investigations (2017).7 Both my previous and this 
current article argue precisely that there are far-reaching and problematical overall 
philosophical consequences of (overt or inadvertent) retentions of an essentialist reading of 
the child, even, or especially, when these retentions occur in analyses which characterise 
themselves otherwise as also “anti-external context”, “non essentialist” or “postmodern”. As 
Philosophical Investigations itself argues: “The question is not of explaining a language 
game by means of our experiences [the child], but of noting a language game [the “child”]” 
(PI 1968: 167). 
Consider for instance Hacker’s commentary on “Does man think, then, because he has 
found that thinking pays?— /Because he thinks it advantageous to think? (Does he bring his 
children up because he has found it pays?”) (PI 1968: 134), where the child seems to be 
involved both in an opposition to “opportunistic” or “calculated” processes-for-profit and in 
the effort to conceive of an activity (the bringing up of children) as “prior to” thought at all: 
One can ask why some parents bring up their children without punishing  
them and why others do not [...] But the question why parents bring up  
their children tout court is surely senseless. Pari passu the question “what  
does this man think for?” is senseless. Reasoning, forming expectations  
grounded in our experience, is as much part of our nature as bringing up  
our children. One can ask for reasons only within the framework of the  
multitudinous activities and undertakings that can be engaged in with or  
without thought and with or without good reasons. (Hacker 1996: 174)  
                                                          
7 In fact, in the few places in which my anti-essentialist argument is engaged with in Peters 
and Stickney’s volume, it is consistently misunderstood and converted to essentialist claims. 
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This shows clearly how different the implications for argument and analysis are when the 
child—and the pathos here accrued to it— are accepted as indeed beyond, or the (possibility 
of an) end of, language (and philosophy), because “natural” or “without reason” (the child as 
not a language game). In contrast, within an analysis of the child as constructed in specific 
perspective —and with no “outside” to language—the question of why parents bring up 
children is not “senseless”, and also not therefore exempt from being part of the 
Philosophical Investigations’ dynamic of creating alternate, temporary, and local positions in 
(and as) the text.  
Here, I follow-up on the current status of readings of the child in relation to 
Philosophical Investigations and the implications of those readings for wider interpretations 
of Philosophical Investigations, noting that there has in the intervening years still been very 
little writing on the child and its consequences in and for this text. I will focus to begin with 
one of the very few works to engage extensively with the child, which is a pedagogical 
engagement with the Philosophical Investigations, Viktor Johansson’s arguments in his thesis 
on “Dissonant voices. Philosophy, Children’s Literature, and Perfectionist Education” (2013). 
I do not, however, wish to discuss Johansson’s work in order primarily to discuss specifically 
pedagogical issues, but because Johansson engages with my previous readings of 
Philosophical Investigations in ways which are helpful to seeing what is at stake specifically 
in differing readings of the child and the consequent differing wider interpretations of 
Philosophical Investigations. I am also not interested here in rebutting Johansson’s critique as 
such, but instead in considering how commitments to the child as natural, real or actual, or 
not, necessarily underpin certain interpretations of the Philosophical Investigations in certain 
ways. For, as I have argued extensively elsewhere in relation to non-essentialist readings of 
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the child, following the seminal arguments of Jacqueline Rose in The Case of Peter Pan or 
the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction (1984):8  
the child is the discursive node of stories of origin, teleology and its determinacies, and 
the complex overlapping ideologies of subjectivity, emotion, and the bourgeois family 
in Western capitalism […] allocated [the] position as a defeater of language, a 
particularly privileged window to the world-as-it-is, liberated from the indeterminacies 
and pluralities of interpretation […] Meanwhile the child also maintains a centripetal 
force as an occasion of pathos and of, moreover - and therefore? - an anti-theoretical 
moment, resistant to analysis, itself the figure deployed as resistance. The child as a 
figure that operates through repetition, and therefore as the repeating figure, is made to 
found the “real” beyond language as the always retrievable already-there. (Lesnik-
Oberstein and Thomson 2002: 36) 
                                                          
8 Rose’s arguments are drawn from her Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan-inflected readings 
of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, which makes it unsurprising that there are some links 
between her and my arguments about the child and Henry Staten’s (1984) writings which link 
Wittgenstein and Derrida’s thinking. Ultimately, however, Staten reads quite differently to 
Rose and myself, drawing still extensively on ideas of communal experience and perception 
which Rose and my non-essentialist view of the child very much puts in to question in turn. 
See for just one example of the difference how Staten reads the opening of the Philosophical 
Investigations as Wittgenstein “trying here and elsewhere to build up a clear picture of how 
we operate with signs” (Staten 1984: 86), while I read this as “In this respect the Aristotle, 
five red apples, builders, and script are all ‘expressly restricted [...] games’ to negotiate 
configurations of notions of language and of ‘understanding’”. (Lesnik-Oberstein 2003: 384) 
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For Johansson, my previous readings of the Philosophical Investigations have: 
lost the confessional and autobiographical dimension of these terms as they are first 
used in Wittgenstein […] as she puts it, that there is no “‘Wittgenstein’ [that is] an 
anterior, autonomous subject whose ‘purpose’ and ‘intent’ produce the meaning of the 
text”. (Lesnik-Oberstein 2003, p. 393) I take it that this can mean two things: (i) 
Wittgenstein’s “I” in this text is continually problematised and evaded; and (ii) that the 
“I” in the text is essentially constructed by the text itself. […] it seems to me that it is 
only in highly theoretical endeavours that we speak of an author as not being in the text. 
Of course there are plenty of examples of texts where the author’s presence is not clear 
or downplayed, but I cannot think of the Investigations as such a text. Wittgenstein’s 
presence is very clear. He frequently refers to himself, to “What do I mean?”, “What I 
am inclined to say”, “Must I know” or “What I wanted to say” and similar expressions. 
He also at times implicates the reader in this, saying “We find”, “We call something” or 
“We can imagine”. […] This is why Lesnik-Oberstein’s insistence that there is no 
Wittgenstein in his text is misleading. Without imagining Wittgenstein the discussion 
between my “We” and his “You” and vice versa would be quite empty. (Johansson 
2013: 155, 159) 
For Johansson, the “confessional and autobiographical dimension” can be “lost” and, 
therefore, also can be in a text from which they have not been “lost”. The “loss” is due to 
“only highly theoretical endeavours”, so that the “confessional and autobiographical” rely for 
him on an already established division between a “highly theoretical” and a non (or not so 
highly) “theoretical”. The investment in the real here is therefore about an “I” that is 
necessarily “an anterior, autonomous subject whose ‘purpose’ and ‘intent’ produce the 
meaning of the text”, or what is here constituted as “presence”. It is therefore entirely 
consistent that for Johansson a critique of a certain understanding of “personhood” as 
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“presence” (or “presence” as “personhood”) leads to the claim that in my reading “there is no 
Wittgenstein in his text”. If claims such as “What do I mean?” are understood as “presence”, 
then the opposite of presence must necessarily be understood as absence. But at stake in my 
argument is precisely how and why to read “I” (all “I”s, not just those in Philosophical 
Investigations)9 as not a matter of either “presence” or a concomitant “absence” (or even, in 
fact, a matter of matter). How, for instance, to account for Johansson’s own claim that 
Wittgenstein “frequently refers to himself”? Here we find anyway already two 
“Wittgensteins”: one who can be read by Johansson to “frequently refer” to another 
(“himself”), which in and of itself also carries with it yet another split or multiplicity in the 
him/self. In other words, where does “presence” reside in these claims? Or is “presence” 
assumed to be in and of it/self the gathering of these multiplicities in to a singularity, always -
- “Wittgenstein”? In other words, as an “I” is for Johansson assumed as an autonomous, 
“psychological” entity, it is – like his assumptions about “the child” – always conceived of as 
not possibly itself a “language game”. These kinds of assumptions, therefore, always produce 
interpretations of the wider Philosophical Investigations as relying necessarily on an a priori 
division between “language games” and a world of identities and objects that are not 
language games, but something other.  
                                                          
9 This issue can be related, for instance, to Alois Pichler’s (2013) consideration of 
assumptions about authorial intentionality and its implications in relation to the differences 
between the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, but Pichler’s arguments address the 
consequences for the views of Wittgenstein as author on the basis of the competing 
interpretations of his texts, while I am pursuing readings shaped by wider critiques of any 
assumptions of authorship as constituted as a self-evident, spontaneous, intentional, non-
textual presence.  
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What further, for instance, of Johansson’s own concluding claim that “[w]ithout 
imagining Wittgenstein the discussion between my “We” and his “You” and vice versa 
would be quite empty”? In any case now “Wittgenstein” is after all absent in needing to be 
“imagined” and this “imagining” is about a “my ‘We’” and a “‘his’ You’”; but why and how 
is “my ‘We’” not Philosophical Investigations’ “We” anyway? How has it become 
Johansson’s, except by Johansson’s own assumption that this “We” is necessarily “the 
reader” who is “implicated” and that he is necessarily that “reader”? But why and where is 
“We” – or Johansson “the reader” in Philosophical Investigations? And how and why is 
“‘his’ You” in “discussion” with “my ‘We’”? Finally, how is it that pronouns have lost their 
relativity and now are held to an absolute stability of being always from no-matter what 
perspective “my” “We” and “his” “You”, where neither can ever become (the) other? How 
can “We” necessarily always be “m[ine]” and “You” always “His”? 
For Johansson, then, my kind of critique of the assumption of “I” as a self-present 
singularity constitutes the loss of “the living conversation the use of ‘I’ and ‘our’ invokes” 
(155), where I can read in the loss of “living” another form of the idea that that vitality is not 
“highly theoretical”, but something other and more than that. It may also be noted that 
Johansson cannot, however, control the shifts in pronouns that cannot but occur when the 
perspectives change, for here the “We” is after all an “our” and the “You” an “I” in terms of 
who are participating in this “conversation”. Therefore when Johansson argues that my 
readings do “not pay enough attention to Wittgenstein’s insistence to write philosophy that is 
drenched in the particularities of (a) human life” (Johansson, 2013: 155), both “life” and 
“particularities” continue to establish claims to more and other than a “highly theoretical”, 
which is maintained in an opposition to the everyday, the material and the real, albeit – even 
so - “imagined”.  
What is it that is crucial to Johansson in his insistence on “presence”? He writes that:  
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in my interactions with texts and with others I rely on my imagination. I am 
constructing futures with my fellow speakers or the texts I am reading. I am living on a 
hope that I can go on with them. This is why children are so important in 
Wittgenstein’s examples. I imagine myself as having a future in language with children 
and I imagine children as being in a position of having a future with me. (Johansson, 
2013: 156) 
This can be related to queer theorist Lee Edelman’s analysis in No Future that 
For politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to 
produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it 
works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to 
transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child [sic]. That Child remains the 
perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every 
political intervention. (Edelman 2004: 2–3, italics in original)10 
If Johansson is at pains to stress that his hopes are about “my imagination”, what he claims as 
being “imagined” by him is, as Edelman’s analysis emphasizes, “a future”, not “my interactions 
with texts and with others”, including “children”, as these are just “there”, and indeed must be 
so as the “presence” which complements Johansson’s (and according to his view, 
Wittgenstein’s) own “presences”. “Presence”, then, depends on a separateness of “subjects” 
and “objects” “with” whom one can then imagine a future together. This is also the absolute 
separateness and presence assigned to his “‘my’ We” and his “‘his’ ‘You’”, invoked to 
guarantee the prevention of emptiness, loss of life, or a future. I understand Johansson to be 
                                                          
10 For my extensive discussion of Edelman’s own assumption of an essentialist child and the 
consequences thereof, however, please see Lesnik-Oberstein (2010). 
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warding off what he sees as the spectre of a “disavowal of identity”, described as follows by 
Diana Fuss in her book Essentially Speaking: 
The deconstruction of identity, then, is not necessarily a disavowal of identity, as has 
occasionally been suggested. Elaine Marks articulates the position I would like to 
articulate here: namely that “there must be a sense of identity, even though it would be 
fictitious.” (1984, p. 110) Fictions of identity, importantly, are no less powerful for being 
fictions (indeed the power of fantasy marks one of Freud’s most radical insights). It is 
not so much that we possess “contingent identities” but that identity itself is contingent: 
“the unconscious constantly reveals the ‘failure’ of identity. Because there is no 
continuity of psychic life, so there is no stability of sexual identity, no position for women 
(or for men) which is ever simply achieved.” (Fuss 1989: 104, my italics) 
The imagining of a future together with the child is Johansson’s key investment, then, 
and it drives and shapes his readings of Wittgenstein accordingly, as we will see an 
investment in the real or actual child – and the child as actuality or reality - always does, 
wherever it may be found. This is because, as I argued above in following Jacqueline 
Rose’s (1984) analysis, once the child is no longer understood as a self-constituted, 
autonomous object, but instead read in perspective, this shifts the child (or any “identity”, 
as Fuss also points out, including “Wittgenstein”) from being simply retrievable through 
memory or observation to being constructed out of an investment or interest (desire), 
albeit unconsciously.  
We can see the ongoing consequences for interpretations of Philosophical Investigations 
when Johansson, for example, considers some of Wittgenstein’s discussions of “agreement” 
in relation to  
[…] difficult situations where we do not know how to go on together, but where it 
seems important, even crucial, that we go on together. We cannot, for example, or at 
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least we don’t want to, at the risk of treating them as mad, exclude children from too 
many of our language games even if we do not share their behaviour or beliefs. In 
school settings we even have a formal obligation to reach an agreement in many 
practices – e.g. we cannot stress enough the importance of coming to agreement about 
the use of, for example, letters and numbers. It would be deeply worrying if we did not 
come to agreement about, for example, how to write a simple series of cardinal 
numbers or the basic uses of letters. (Johansson 2013: 174) 
Here, “we” are not the “children” who may or may not be “excluded from too many of our 
language games”, where “language games” are the property of the “we [who] do not share 
[the children’s] behaviour and beliefs”. In this perspective, then, “behaviour and beliefs” are 
not “language games”, and, significantly, however different the children’s “behaviour and 
beliefs” may be seen to be they are nevertheless still known as such by the “we” who are 
themselves not the “children”. This raises the inherent question of how the “agreement” that 
is to be “reached” is to be understood as an “agreement”? For if this is about both the “we” 
and the “children” “us[ing…] letters and numbers” and knowing “how to write a simple 
series”, then how can the “we” know that this “go[ing] on together” is on the part of the 
“children” voluntary and on the basis of a mutual understanding of such tasks? It is 
necessarily the case that this is the “we’s” own claim: no matter how much they insist on 
their separateness from the “children”, they cannot, paradoxically, overcome that the 
“children” are the product of their own perspective, including their own insistence on there 
being a separation from themselves. Even if “agreement” would be taken here merely in its 
sense of an alignment of “many practices”, regardless of implications of intentional 
voluntariness, commitment, or understanding, nevertheless this alignment, seen as lacking on 
the part of the “children” initially, must be approved as such from a perspective which 
proclaims itself as other to that of the “children”. In any case, then, this must preclude 
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“agreement” as a state that is “reached” or “come to” mutually, but can only be an observed 
achievement of alignment of “many practices” as required by the “we” who is under “formal 
obligation” and would be “deeply worried” if that alignment did not take place. As Johansson 
himself writes, “[w]e may read this passage [(PI 1968: 82)] as saying, ‘agreement is not only 
agreement in how we go on together, but a “shared human behaviour”,” where it is the 
“shared” that continues to uphold the paradox that a mutual voluntariness is claimed by the 
“we” on behalf of all involved according to the “we” themselves. How can this fulfil 
Johansson’s stated aim of clarifying further Wittgenstein’s views with respect to 
“agreement”? He develops his interpretation as follows: 
If the focus in the rule-following discussion is how we can go on together with our 
words, how we can go on together with words in rule-formulations, instructions, signs 
and so on, then the private language discussion can be seen as giving examples of how, 
when, and what may drive us to not go on together, or when we are unsure if there is a 
“together”, a “We”, at all. (Johansson 2013: 175) 
This confirms Johansson’s reliance on a “together” and a “we” which are seen to be “there” 
in Philosophical Investigations except in the “private language discussion”.  
I can also approach this question of the consequences of certain readings of the “we” 
in relation to “children” and “agreement” from another angle, which is to consider how 
Johansson is interpreting this section at all in reading Wittgenstein’s “[t]he common 
behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown 
language” (PI 1968: 82), “as saying ‘agreement is not only agreement in how we go on 
together, but a “shared human behaviour”.’” First, I do not read that “the common behaviour 
of mankind” is here claimed as a “fact” of there being “a shared human behaviour” as it 
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seems to me to be in Johansson’s reading.11 Instead, this is subject to Wittgenstein’s proposal 
to “[s]uppose you came as an explorer”, in order to consider “what if one person reacts in one 
way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?” (PI 1968: 82) 
The “supposing” of “the common behaviour of mankind is a system of reference” is then 
itself undermined as Wittgenstein works through further that “there is no regular connection 
between what they say, the sounds they make, and their actions; but still these sounds are not 
superfluous, for if we gag one of the people, it has the same consequences as with us; without 
the sounds their actions fall into confusion – as I feel like putting it” (PI 1968: 82). What is at 
stake here is what it takes “for us to call it ‘language’” (PI 1968: 82), which is here seen to be 
about the problem of “regularity”, a “regularity” which can be insufficient from the 
perspective of the “us” “to call […] language” that which is initially was only “apparently, an 
articulate language” (PI 1968: 82, my italics). There are, after all, to “us” now only “what 
they say, the sounds they make, and their actions”, and even “their actions fall into 
confusion”, and even this is subject to “as I feel like putting it” (PI 1968: 82). In other words, 
I do not understand these passages to be about “agreement”, in Johansson’s terms, but about 
how a certain perspective (“I”) “feels like putting it”, in terms of its own “defining ‘order’ 
and ‘rule’ by means of “regularity”’ and its subsequent and crucial further question, “[h]ow 
do I explain the meaning of ‘regular’, ‘uniform’, ‘same’ to anyone?” (PI 1968: 82-3), where 
the problem of perspective hinges on knowing the “same” language anyway already 
(“corresponding French words”) or on, again, as before, not doing so, which then enters into 
                                                          
11 Newton Garver, for instance, like Johansson also accepts § 206 (PI 1968: 82) as a 
statement on Wittgenstein’s part about “these certainties, requirements of communicating and 
understanding at all” (Garver 1994: 281), whereas I am not reading it as about Wittgenstein’s 
view of “certainties”, but precisely as itself framed in turn by conditions and contingencies. 
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the discussions in PI § 208 to PI § 216 (PI 1968: 82-85) about how it can then be known, and 
by whom, how any “concept” is taught and known to be “understood” as such at all. It may be 
no surprise, in relation to my own prior discussion above about Johansson’s requirement of 
“presence” in relation to Wittgenstein as “author”, how related Wittgenstein’s comments in 
this section on “identity” are to those I quoted by Diane Fuss: as Wittgenstein writes,  
I feel like saying: “Here at any rate there can’t be a variety of interpretations. If you are 
seeing a thing you are seeing identity too”. Then are two things the same when they are 
what one thing is? And how am I to apply what the one thing shews me to the case of 
two things? (PI 1968: 84) 
If for Johansson, then, the “I” and the “we” of Philosophical Investigations guarantee 
also a child – and its “dissonant voice”12 - which can be known and understood as such from 
a perspective other to itself, then this also allows his readings of Philosophical Investigations 
ultimately to support and justify a pedagogy in which his stated aim is for  
My “I” [to be] lost in the interaction with the dissonant voice in that it shows me a 
further possible self in new forms of interactions and other forms of “We”. 
Improvisations with dissonance involve the discovery and rediscovery of a 
dissatisfaction with our present selves that involves taking a stand. The recurrent 
dissonances in our interactions mean that this work is never done, particularly in 
teaching. (Johansson 2013: 298) 
                                                          
12 Although arguments such as those of Stern (2004) and Pichler (2013) position themselves 
as anti-external context, like Johansson they nevertheless also rely on the use of “voice” and 
its attendant assumptions of autonomy, origin and distinction. Most importantly, “voice” 
therefore escapes the consequences of being read as within framing perspectives. 
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As much as - and precisely because - I am in sympathy with Johansson’s intentions in a 
general sense, my concern remains that a “dissonance” that can be identified and understood 
as such, is already obedient to that desire which wishes that specific “dissonance” to do the 
job of making “[m]y “I”’ lost to itself in order to “show me a further possible self”.13 As I 
have read above, this “I”, however, necessarily by its own admission, is and cannot be “lost”, 
after all, as it is always known from another perspective as “my” “I”, and only all the more as 
it is known to be “lost” and different from the “further possible self”. There is here another 
perspective which can see all these different “Is” and judge which is changed as desired by 
which “dissonance” and which not. It seems to me that Johansson is struggling with these 
issues with great engagement, but my fear is that the stakes in the child with (and as) the 
dissonant voice, and a reading of Wittgenstein which supports it, overlooks the very 
centrality of perspectives and their implications to both childhood and the arguments of 
Philosophical Investigations as I read them. 
 I want now to turn to another engagement with Philosophical Investigations and the 
child, which, like Johansson’s arguments, has consequences for the readings of the text, and 
which also engages with the “cognitive and neuro-turn” of the recent past decades.14 Richard 
Eldridge, in his chapter on “Wittgenstein on Aspect-Seeing, the Nature of Discursive 
Consciousness, and the Experience of Agency” (2010), wishes to explore through 
Philosophical Investigations “just what are judgement and discursive consciousness? And 
how can they possibly arise in us?” (Eldridge 2010: 163) as, he argues, ‘[h]appily, there is a 
                                                          
13 For an extensive analysis of the problematic consequences of seeing the child in education 
as “dissonance” please see Cocks (2009). 
14 For my extensive, wider critiques of claims in and about neuroscience and cognitive 
science in relation to emotion please see Lesnik-Oberstein (2015) and (2016). 
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kind of address or answer to these questions – and one quite different from what is envisioned 
in naturalist, conventionalist, and communitarian misreadings of Philosophical 
Investigations– in the text of Philosophical Investigations itself, in the discussions of seeing-
as in Part II, Section 11 and in related remarks about coming to experience the meaning of a 
word” (Eldridge 2010: 166). To embark on this exploration, Eldridge proposes first to draw 
on the work of the “cultural-developmental-cognitive scientist […] Michael Tomasello [who] 
has surveyed the existing studies of primate ‘cognition’ and of human cognitive development 
[and] has developed a persuasive account of just what we do in learning language and in 
learning to understand under concepts” (Eldridge 2010: 166-167). For Eldridge, “we will then 
be in a position to be […] alert both to how seeing-as plays a fundamental role in learning to 
understand and to how seeing-as and understanding are things that we do [... and w]e will be 
able then to follow Wittgenstein’s thoughts about the (co-)dawning of discursive 
consciousness and agency and about the human circumstances, plights, and possibilities that 
come with those dawnings” (Eldridge 2010: 167). 
 Eldridge invokes Tomasello’s arguments in relation to reading Philosophical 
Investigations in order to identify and support ideas there too of “joint attentional 
interactions” and “the irreducibility of agency to material processes”15 (Eldridge 2010: 179): 
The development of explicit linguistic, conceptual, and cultural abilities then depends 
crucially on ontogenetic-developmental processes “by which human children actively 
                                                          
15 For an extensive critique of “voice” and “agency” specifically in relation to the child but 
also more widely please see Lesnik-Oberstein (2011), and for more analysis of problems with 
evolutionary and cognitive psychology and neuroscience’s claims about infants and “joint 
attentional interactions” please see Lesnik-Oberstein (2015) and (2017) and Cocks and 
Lesnik-Oberstein (2017). 
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exploit and make use of both their biological and cultural inheritances”. [Tomasello 
1999: 11, Eldridge’s italics …] Two crucial dimensions of these processes are that they 
involve children actively doing something, and they require and involve identification 
with other human beings as havers of a point of view. […] “Human beings ‘identify’ 
with conspecifics more deeply than other primates. This identification is not something 
mysterious, but simply the process by which the human child understands that other 
persons are like herself – in a way that inanimate objects are not, for example – and so 
she sometimes tries to understand things from their point of view (Eldridge 2010: 167-
168, Eldridge’s italics). 
“Human children” here possess “their biological and cultural inheritances” which, however, 
they do nothing with, until the “development of […] abilities” which “depends crucially on 
ontogenetic-developmental processes” “by which human children actively exploit and make 
use of [those] inheritances”.16 The first question, then, to be raised about “activity” is how 
“agentic” the exploitation and making use are when they are themselves “processes” “by 
which” (my italics) the human children mine “inheritances”; “inheritances”, moreover, which 
are already there, waiting to be exploited and made use of and “inherited” by the “human 
children” from elsewhere, outside of their control? This “agency” then, is known here as 
already inevitable, following a pre-determined and given path, governed by “processes”. The 
processes are already known too to have “[t]wo crucial dimensions”, which, furthermore, 
“require and involve identification with other human beings as havers of a point of view” 
(first italics mine), where the processes again govern through “requir[ing]” something of, and 
“involving”, the human children. The requirement is that the human child knows itself 
                                                          
16 For a classic critique of the trope of “development” in (developmental) psychology please 
see Burman (1994). 
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already as a “human being”, although this perspective knows it to be different in being also 
“human children”. As “human children” they do not, initially, identify with “other human 
beings as havers of a point of view”, which must mean they either do not initially know they 
themselves are a “haver of a point of view”, or that they do know this, but they do not, 
initially, know other human beings do too.  
Key to this is the understanding of “identification”, which is here seen to be about 
“simply the process by which the human child understands that other persons are like herself 
– in a way that inanimate objects are not, for example – and so she sometimes tries to 
understand things from their point of view”. This perspective knows that “inanimate objects” 
are not “like” the human child, and also knows that the human child knows this too, but 
“other persons” “are like herself”, so that “a way” of being “like” is the key difference 
between the human child, persons and inanimate objects, all of which are known to be 
different, but to have a “way” of similarity, which, however, does not overcome that 
difference (they remain only “like”). The human child, then, initially does not know that there 
is a similarity between herself and other persons and inanimate objects, but comes to do so 
“by” a “process”.  
Besides raising the question of how agentic an agency is which is entirely externally 
pre-determined in both its presence, ways, means, and achievements, there is the further issue 
of what is constituted as a “point of view”, which here, in these claims, must be seen as a 
“point of view”; a “point of view”, moreover, which can be seen from no “point of view”. For 
this perspective can recognise human children’s initial position as having no identification 
with other human beings as havers of a point of view, so that the children are either known 
always already to have a point of view themselves, but not yet to know other human beings 
have it too, or they are known initially not to have a point of view, but come to have one by 
an identification with other human beings who do. All of these claims rest on a paradox: the 
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point-of-view-haver either can know itself to have and be a “point of view”, in which case 
from which “point of view” (or none) does it know this? Or if the claim stands that the point-
of-view-haver initially does not have a “point of view” at all anyway, then how can it “see” 
any other “point of view” from another “point of view?” Finally, this paradox also operates 
in: “so she sometimes tries to understand things from their point of view”, where it must be 
known that “she” knows when she is “sometimes” trying to understand “things from their 
point of view”, and both fails in the attempt (“tries”) and from another perspective can be 
seen to have a perspective (“point of view”?17) on whether she is “understanding things from 
their point of view” or not. These are fundamental questions for Wittgenstein, I would argue, 
just as when he discusses, for instance, making claims about “seeing”, “interpretation”, 
“visual experience”, and “perception”, to ask “but what is different: my impression? My 
point of view? – Can I say? I describe the alternation like a perception; quite as if the object 
had altered before my eyes” (PI 1968: 193-195), where, it seems to me, the question is above 
all about the possibility of “Can I say? I describe” not in terms simply of “content”, but 
precisely in terms of what it means to “say” and “describe” “seeing” (that is, a talking or 
writing a seeing which it is not, according to itself); as Wittgenstein adds:  
What is the criterion of the visual experience? – The criterion? What do you suppose? 
The representation of “what is seen”. The concept of a representation of what is seen, 
like that of a copy, is very elastic, and so together with it is the concept of what is seen. 
The two are intimately connected. (Which is not to say that they are alike.) (PI 1968: 
198; italics in original) 
                                                          
17 I ask this question precisely to stress that “perspective” and “point of view” and their 
implications should not be necessarily conflated, whereas they often are. 
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It is all the more crucial that these issues about perspectives on perspectives and “points of 
view”, and what they are said, called, written and read to be, are raised as Eldridge is writing 
about “aspect-seeing” in a volume devoted specifically to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, where it 
is the core claim of the editors that it “would be a cute pun, but a sad excuse for a book, if this 
volume of new essays offered simply the promise of ‘seeing’ and describing ‘aspects’ in 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-seeing. […] it matters that these essays also have 
something to contribute to that perennial, and perhaps most pressing, question in 
understanding the late Wittgenstein: What does it mean to read the text called Philosophical 
Investigations? (Day & Krebs 2010: 1-2) It is, indeed, the core issue for me too, as I have 
been arguing throughout this article, that reading perspectives in Philosophical 
Investigations, including reading the child in perspective raises the fundamental question of 
“what does it mean to read the text called Philosophical Investigations?”  
Finally, a return to (re-)reading even small sections of “the discussions of seeing-as in 
Part II, Section 11 and in related remarks about coming to experience the meaning of a word” 
(Eldridge 2010: 166) once more elaborates the different consequences of such different 
readings, with Eldridge, in the light of Tomasello, arguing that 
[Wittgenstein] remarks at one point on “a game played by children: they say that a 
chest, for example, is a house; and thereupon it is interpreted as a house in every detail. 
A piece of fancy is worked into it” (PI 206e). This remark suggests that the appearance 
of fancy (invention: Erfindung) within game-playing in the life of the child is akin to 
seeing an aspect. When we further notice the remark that seeing an aspect bears “a 
close relationship with ‘experiencing the meaning of a word’ (PI 210c; see also 214d), 
then the suggestion is not far off that it is by exercising fancy (inventiveness, 
imagination) within the context of game-playing that children come to learn language at 
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all (by catching on to the aspects of things that are “embodied” in words). (Eldridge 
2010: 172, italics in original) 
It is key to our differing readings that Eldridge reads the “remark” as within the frame of 
“Wittgenstein connect[ing] his investigation of aspect-seeing more closely with the learning 
of language than might initially meet the eye”, (Eldridge 2010: 172) while I read it within the 
frame of the discussion of the “representation of ‘what is seen’” (PI 1968: 198), within which 
Wittgenstein is working through: “Do not try to analyse your own inner experience. […] Ask 
‘What do I know about someone else?” (PI 1968: 204, 206), where the child, as so often in 
Philosophical Investigations, stands for one of the experimental and always provisional 
“others”. If for Eldridge, then, “this remark suggests that the appearance of fancy (invention: 
Erfindung) within game-playing in the life of the child is akin to seeing an aspect”, for me it 
is about the perspective on the child which is asking itself if and how it can ask: “And does 
the child now see the chest as a house?” (PI 1968: 206) to which comes a reply from another 
perspective, according to the perspective,18 “He quite forgets that it is a chest; for him it is 
actually a house” (PI 1968: 206), which the perspective confirms as a valid observation 
through “(There are definite tokens of this)” (PI 1968: 206), which leads then to the query 
whether “Then would it not also be correct to say he sees it as a house?” (PI 1968: 206). This 
question here is about what it is “correct to say” on the part of the observed observer about a 
“seeing as”, of which the “definite tokens” are part. It is important to note here, then, how the 
                                                          
18 As in my discussions above about Johansson’s worries about my position vis-à-vis the “I”, 
this “another” can in my reading only be produced in and by the perspective itself, not some 
wholly external and separate “otherness”, even if understood as an “internal monologue”, 
(where externality and separateness are still maintained, but as different internal modules, for 
instance.) 
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“representation of ‘what is seen’” is being claimed, and it is in terms of “[h]e quite forgets:” 
for the observed observer of the child, the children did once know the chest to be a chest, but 
upon the “game” being “played” the children “say that a chest, for example, is a house, and 
thereupon it is interpreted as a house in every detail” (my italics). These are the “definite 
tokens” to the observed observer, and I read them under the frame of Wittgenstein’s prior  
How does one play the game: “It could be this too”? (What a figure could also be—
which is what it can be seen as—is not simply another figure. If someone said “I see 
[triangle] as [arrow]”, he might still be meaning very different things). (PI 1968: 206) 
If the children’s game is one example of how “the game: ‘It could be this too’?” is being 
played by “someone else”, then the next consideration is about that  
if you knew how to play this game, and, given a particular situation, you exclaimed 
with special expression “Now it’s a house!””—you would be giving expression to the 
dawning of an aspect. […] But the expression in one’s voice and gestures is the same as 
if the object had altered and had ended up by becoming this or that. (PI 1968: 206, 
italics in original) 
Now “you” is the “someone else”, albeit that it is only hypothetical that they would “know 
how to play this game”, unlike the children, who are claimed to know how to play it; but it is 
by the perspective that the “special expression” is “heard” in such “a certain way” that “I 
should say, now he’s seeing the picture as a rabbit” (PI 1968: 206). However, this 
hypothetical and provisional saying (“I should say”) of a “seeing as”, subsequently collapses 
under “[b]ut the expression in one’s voice and gestures is the same as if the object had altered 
and had ended by becoming this or that” (PI 1968: 206), where I can, ultimately, read a key 
irony in the claim to the perceived “same[ness]” of “the expression in one’s voice and 
gestures” which must rely on a comparison of changes in “one’s voice and gestures” while 
the “object” is seen to remain unaltered (“as if”). In a further irony, moreover - and this is the 
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challenge of “the child” too - “Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: 
assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your 
memory constantly deceives you” (PI 1968: 206), where the “idea of the private object has 
[not] been [got] rid of” by “way” of the change that has here been noticed because the 
memory of the deception of memory here has not deceived, so that the “assum[ption]” of 
“constant change” merely endorses the “it” that it ought to have banished.  
In conclusion, then, rather than assuming the child is known and knowable, and that 
pedagogy (in its narrow sense) is about acting on that knowledge in the best possible ways, I 
argue that Philosophical Investigations models instead in this sense a pedagogy which 
requires an ongoing attention to the details of the readings of the child and perspectives on 
the child in their own right and locally, rather than a leaving behind or sloughing-off of those 
local readings and perspectives as one perceives oneself to have overcome or progressed 
beyond them to a clear and healthy, final knowledge of the universal child – perspective 
overcome. Further, there is also the well-established argument that the Philosophical 
Investigations is “pedagogical” in the wider philosophical sense, for instance in the writing of 
Michael Peters and James Marshall: “Wittgenstein’s ‘style’ is, in a crucial sense, 
pedagogical; [...] appreciating his style is essential to understanding the purpose and intent of 
his philosophy, especially his later philosophy” (Peters & Marshall 1999: 155). Although 
some of their arguments point in a similar direction to my own, Peters and Marshall’s 
“pedagogy” relies, however, on three assumptions I do not share, as I have argued here: that 
“style” is somehow one necessarily stable, detectable and specific aspect of text; that 
“Wittgenstein” is an anterior, autonomous subject whose “purpose” and “intent” (as well as 
his “experiences”, such as having been a primary school teacher) produce the meanings of the 
text; and that this pedagogy can have as achievable “its aim to show the fly the way out of the 
fly-bottle. The aim of the great educator is to teach us to think for ourselves” (Peters & 
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Marshall 1999: 189).19 In not allowing the child (or anything else) to constitute an a priori 
extra-textual (not language-game) my interpretations of Philosophical Investigations 
consequently resisted and continues to resist also the teleological aspect I read in several 
critics’ use of the “therapeutic” in relation to Wittgenstein’s work (not necessarily the same 
way “therapeutic” occurs in the Wittgenstein texts).20 See also in relation to this, for one 
further instance of many, part I, section 322: “this misleads us into concluding that 
understanding is a specific indefinable experience. But we forget that what should interest us 
is the question: how do we compare these experiences; what criterion of identity do we fix for 
their occurrence?” (PI 1968: 105, italics in original) Finally, it remains of key interest to me 
that, as Jacqueline Rose (1984) argued, the extensive mutual implications of assumptions 
about both childhood and philosophy remain so resistant to being brought together for 
analysis or close examination in relation to one another.21 
References: 
Baker, Gordon & Hacker, Peter: Wittgenstein. Understanding and Meaning. Volume 1 of  
                                                          
19 These positions too remain largely unchanged in Peters and Stickney (2017). 
 
20 See also, for instance, Alice Crary’s introduction to The New Wittgenstein (2000). 
21 Even one of the only non-educational works on childhood and philosophy, Anthony 
Krupp’s Reason’s Children: Childhood in Early Modern Philosophy (2009) does not mention 
Jacqueline Rose’s arguments but only concludes rather nervously that “If my book seems 
more congenial to constructionism than to essentialism, this is primarily because I have 
studied ideas about children, rather than actual children” (Krupp 2009: 21), thereby 
advertently or inadvertently placing itself in the essentialist position. Krupp also does not 
mention my own prior readings of John Locke’s claims about childhood from a non-
essentialist position (Lesnik-Oberstein 1994). 
28 
 
An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Oxford 1980.  
Hacker, Peter: Wittgenstein. Meaning and Mind. Volume 3 of An Analytical Commentary on 
the Philosophical Investigations, Oxford 1990. 
Baker, Gordon: Section 122. Neglected Aspects, in: Robert Arrington & Hans Johann Glock 
(eds): Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Text and Context, London & New York 
1991. 
Burman, Erica: Deconstructing Developmental Psychology, London 1994. 
Hacker, Peter: Wittgenstein. Mind and Will. Volume 4 of An Analytical Commentary on the 
Philosophical Investigations, Oxford 1996. 
Cavell, Stanley: Notes and Afterthoughts on the Opening of Wittgenstein’s Investigations, in: 
Hans Sluga & David Stern (eds): The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge 
1996.  
Cocks, Neil: Student Centred. Education, Freedom and the Idea of Audience, Ashby-de-la-
Zouche 2009. 
Crary, Alice: Introduction, in: Alice Crary & Rupert Read (eds): The New Wittgenstein, 
London & New York 2000. 
Day, William & Krebs, Victor: Introduction, in: William Day & Victor Krebs (eds): Seeing 
Wittgenstein Anew, Cambridge 2010. 
Edelman, Lee: No Future. Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Durham NC 2004. 
Eldridge, Richard: Leading a Human Life. Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism, 
Chicago 1997. 
Eldridge, Richard: Wittgenstein on Aspect-Seeing. The Nature of Discursive Consciousness, 
and the Experience of Agency, in: William Day & Victor Krebs (eds): Seeing Wittgenstein 
Anew, Cambridge 2010. 
Fuss, Diana: Essentially Speaking. Feminism, Nature and Difference, London 1989. 
29 
 
Garver, Newton: Preface, in: Jacques Derrida. Speech and Phenomena, translated by David 
B. Allison, Evanston, ILL 1973. 
Garver, Newton: This Complicated Form of Life. Essays on Wittgenstein, Chicago 1994. 
Johansson, Viktor: Dissonant Voices. Philosophy, Children’s Literature, and Perfectionist 
Education. Stockholm: Doktorsavhandlingar Från Institutionen för Didaktik och Pedagogic 
Vol. 22, 2013 [PDF Downloaded 23rd June 2015]. 
Krupp, Anthony: Reason’s Children. Childhood in Early Modern Philosophy. Lewisburg, PA 
2009. 
Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín: Children’s Literature. Criticism and the Fictional Child. Oxford 
1994. 
Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín: The Philosophical Investigations’ Children, in: Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2003. 
Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín: Childhood, Queer Theory and Feminism, in: Feminist Theory, Vol. 
11, No. 3, 2010. 
Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín: Voice, Agency and the Child, in: Karín Lesnik-Oberstein (ed.): 
Children in Culture, Revisited. Further Approaches to Childhood, London and New York 
2011. 
Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín: Motherhood, Evolutionary Psychology and Mirror Neurons or 
“Grammar is Politics by Other Means”, in: Feminist Theory, Volume 16, No. 2, 2015. 
Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín: The Object of Neuroscience and Literary Studies, in: Textual 
Practice, DOI: 10.1080/0950236X.2016.1237989, 2016. 
Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín and Cocks, Neil: Back to Where We Came From. Evolutionary 
Psychology and Children’s Literature and Media, in: Elisabeth Wesseling (ed.): Reinventing 
Childhood Nostalgia. Books, Toys, and Contemporary Media Culture. Studies in Childhood. 
1700 to the Present, London 2017.  
30 
 
Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín: Children’s Literature, Cognitivism and Neuroscience, in: Sandra 
Dinter and Ralf Schneider (eds.): Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Childhood in 
Contemporary Britain. Literature, Media and Society. Studies in Childhood. 1700 to the 
Present. London 2017.  
Lesnik-Oberstein, Karín & Thomson, Stephen: What is Queer Theory Doing with the Child? 
in: Parallax, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2002. 
Matthews, Gareth: The Philosophy of Childhood, Cambridge, MA 1996. 
Maruyama, Yasushi: Wittgenstein’s Children. Some Implications for Teaching and 
Otherness, in: Paideia. Philosophy of Education, Paper Presented at the Twentieth World 
Congress of Philosophy, Boston, MA 1998 [Accessed originally in 2002 but no longer on the 
internet] 
McDougall, Derek: Reading the Opening of the Philosophical Investigations. The Role of the 
Shopkeeper, the Builders and Augustine’s Child in a “Community View” of Wittgenstein’s 
Text, in: Wittgenstein Studien, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2017. 
Peters, Michael: Deranging the Investigations. Cavell on the Figure of the Child. Paper 
Presented to a Symposium on Cavell. Philosophy of Education Annual Conference, New 
Orleans, 1999, available at http://x.ed.uiuc.edu/PES/99_pre/peters_full.html 
Peters, Michael & Marshall, James: Wittgenstein, Styles, and Pedagogy, in: Michael Peters & 
James Marshall (eds): Wittgenstein. Philosophy, Postmodernism, Pedagogy. London & 
Westport, CT 1999.  
Peters, Michael and Stickney, Jeff (eds): A Companion to Wittgenstein and Education. 
Pedagogical Investigations. Singapore 2017. 
Pichler, Alois: Reflections on a Prominent Argument in the Wittgenstein Debate, in: 
Philosophy and Literature, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2013. 
31 
 
Rose, Jacqueline: The Case of Peter Pan or the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction. London 
1984. 
Staten, Henry: Wittgenstein and Derrida, Lincoln, NB 1984. 
Stern, David: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. An Introduction. Cambridge 2004. 
Tomasello, Michael: The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, MA 1999. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Philosophical Investigations, third edition, edited by Gertrude 
Anscombe and Rush Rees, translated by Gertrude Anscombe, Oxford 1968 [1953].  
 
